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The implementation of the Canada Health and Social Transfer in 1996 marked a new era for the Canadian welfare state, as
greater discretion in the area of social welfare policy and programming was granted to the provinces. In this study, the authors analyzed nationally representative data to determine if
the governing provincial parties, characterized by distinct ideological and party platform positions, differed in regards to their
poverty reduction effectiveness during 1996-2005. The authors'
analysis yielded no differences between the governing provincial parties in terms of their poverty reduction effectiveness.
The study's implications for future research, including research
on subnational variation in social welfare policy, are discussed.
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Canada is a nation whose political system is predicated
upon federalism, as its Constitution provides the formal authorization for the existence of a centralized federal government and 10 provincial governments. While the authority for
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social welfare is shared between these two levels of government, primary jurisdiction lies with the provinces (Armitage,
2003).
In 1996, the marked influence of neo-liberalism within
Canada was apparent as the Canada Health and Social Transfer
(CHST) replaced the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), thereby
ushering in a major change in how the costs of various social
programs were covered. Under CAP, the federal government
and the provinces utilized an open-ended matching grant
system by sharing on a 50-50 basis the costs to fund social
programs, all of which were administered by the provinces.
With the CHST, however, CAP was replaced by a block grant
system in which the provinces were allocated a fixed amount
of funding for delivering their social programs. This translated
into a 15% decrease in federal transfers for health, postsecondary education, and social welfare programs (Gaszo & Krahn,
2008; Prentice, 1999; Weaver, 2000; Weaver, Habibov, & Fan,
2010).
Moreover, the devolutionary shift prompted by the CHST
resulted in greater authority for the provinces within the realm
of social welfare. Consequently, the provinces introduced a
series of measures aimed at reducing the long-term costs of
welfare programs. For example, in order to reduce welfare caseloads, provinces tightened their eligibility criteria surrounding
the receipt of social assistance. There was a noticeable increase
in case reviews and investigations into alleged welfare fraud,
and life insurance policies and an increase in the value of a
home while the owner received social assistance were factored
in when computing the amount of benefits to which an applicant was entitled (Habibov & Fan, 2007; Hick, 2007; McMullin
& Tomchick, 2004; Sceviour & Finnie, 2004).
Not surprisingly, this substantial change in the structure
and nature of welfare programming prompted policy researchers to embark on scholarly investigations to determine how
devolution and the concomitant increased emphasis on costcutting driven by neo-liberalism impacted the safety nets of
Canadian provinces (Boychuk, 2006). For instance, Lightman,
Herd, and Mitchell (2008), as well as Lemieux and Milligan
(2007), focused on particular welfare reform strategies within
specific provinces, while other researchers (Boychuk, 2006;
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Habibov & Fan, 2010; Finnie, Irvine, & Sceviour, 2004a, 2004b;
Roy, 2004) conducted interprovincial comparisons of welfare
programs over time. While the above studies provide noteworthy contributions to the literature, they fail to address important areas that concern the policy community, including
the ostensive reason for the existence of the programs, that is,
their capacity to reduce poverty. Furthermore, they did not
compare the influence governing political parties may have on
the poverty reduction effectiveness of the specific provinces.
Even though the impact of governing political parties on the
efficacy of states' social safety nets has been explored within an
American context (Budge & Hofferbert, 1990; Dye, 1984; Lee,
2009), this area has been virtually ignored by Canadian policy
scholars. Highlighting the gap in the current literature, Imbeau
et al. (2000) report there is little "knowledge based on reliable
quantitative measures of party influence in the Canadian provinces" (p. 789), including knowledge pertaining to the social
welfare arena. Clearly, there is a need for interprovincial comparative research which could contribute "to the development
of theories specific to subnational public policy" (p. 804).
It is this need that provided the rationale for this study. The
research question this study addresses is as follows: Under the
global neoliberal trend, did the poverty-reduction effectiveness of the Canadian provinces differ according to the political
party that was in power within each province? In particular,
the capacity of three major provincial social welfare programs
to reduce poverty is assessed for each province across time.
These programs are Social Assistance, Provincial Tax Credits,
and Workers' Compensation. For all of these programs, each
province established its own rules, including eligibility criteria
and regulations for accessing and discontinuing the receipt of
benefits (Habibov & Fan, 2007, 2008; Hick, 2007).
This study builds on our previous larger study, in which
we detected noticeable differences in how the poverty reduction effectiveness of the provincial social welfare programs
changed during 1996-2005 (Weaver, Habibov, & Fan, 2010).
Consequently, this study, which also focuses on 1996-2005, seeks
to determine if governing political parties accounted for this
interprovincial difference in poverty reduction effectiveness.
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Literature Review
There have been a variety of studies, some of which are
couched within an international context, that consider the
effects of political parties on various dimensions of policy development and implementation, including welfare programs.
Brady (2003) conducted a panel analysis of 16 economically
advanced Western democracies from 1967 to 1997 in order to
see if political institutions largely informed by leftist ideology
actually reduced poverty. The extent to which political institutions were informed by leftist ideology was measured by indicators such as proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by
members of leftist parties and the proportion of the labor force

that was unionized. The author concludes that the "most important conclusion to emerge from this study is that left political institutions greatly reduce poverty ... despite controlling

for economic and demographic factors" (p. 14). He found that
leftist political institutions in Western Europe and Australia
evinced a stronger association with poverty reduction than
did the Democratic Party in the United States, which is more
associated with providing social welfare measures to the lowincome population than its counterpart, the Republican Party.
Blaise, Blake, and Dion (1993) examined 15 liberal democracies with developed economies from 1960 to 1987 with the
main dependent variable being domestic spending (excluding
defense spending) as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product

(GDP). The authors found that majority governments controlled by left-wing political parties tended to spend more on
social welfare measures than those controlled by right-wing
parties. The authors pointed out, however, that the extent to
which differences in social welfare spending can be attributed
to the political orientation of the government is "a small one.
That difference, moreover, is confined to majority governments
and takes time to set in" (p. 57).
In a related study, Rice (1986) examined the determinants of
growth in the size of the governments of 12 European nations
from 1950 to 1980. Growth was measured as the ratio of government expenditures to GDP. The findings of the study suggest
that "leftist strength in government may lead to government
growth" (p. 248), but Rice adds that although "the data suggest
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that political gains by conservatives may retard the rate of government ... it is doubtful such leadership changes can halt the

growth" (p. 251).
In another cross-national study, Burstein and Linton (2002)
conducted an analysis of 53 articles on determinants of policy
changes from the three most prestigious sociology journals
and three most prestigious political science journals from 1990
to 2000. Their findings indicate that although the platforms of
political parties were associated with policy changes, political
parties were no more influential upon public policy than were
other political organizations such as interest groups and social
movement organizations. Moreover, they found that the likelihood of a political organization directly affecting policy is only
around 50%.
In studies pertaining to the transformative welfare reform
efforts in America following the promulgation of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) in 1996, both Lieberman and Shaw (2000) and
Lee (2009) found that Republican governorships were associated with states adopting strict welfare policies that led to
a reduction in benefits. Lieberman and Shaw (2000) note this
relationship was particularly robust when the President was
a Democrat, prompting them to opine that this "may reflect
nothing more than the growing preponderance of Republican
governors, especially in large states, during the 1990s, but it
may reflect the increasing willingness of Republicans to challenge traditional social policies to which Democrats remained
committed for longer" (p. 230).
There is a conspicuous absence of such studies within the
Canadian context. P6try (1995) and Erickson & Laycock (2002)
detected the influence of the New Democrat Party (NDP) in
terms of welfare state expansion at the federal level in its capacity as an opposition government (the NDP has never been
in power at the federal level), a phenomenon described as
"contagion from the left" (P6try, 1995, p. 84). These findings,
however, cannot be generalized to provincial politics.
Gazso and Krahm (2008) report that Alberta was the first
of the Canadian provinces to severely tighten eligibility requirements and reduce its level of welfare benefits during the
1990s. One noteworthy aspect of the authors' analysis was that
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Alberta was headed by the Progressive Conservative Party
during this time, as its cutbacks to Social Assistance were in
accord with the party's reputation as endorsing right-wing
policy stances.
In a study pertaining to the province of Ontario, Canada's
most populous province (Statistics Canada, 2009), Klassen
and Buchannan (2006) examined the role of political party
influence on the province's welfare policy between 1985 and
2000-a time frame in which three political parties, that is,
the Liberals, NDP, and Progressive Conservatives, respectively ruled in Ontario, each for a five-year period. The authors
observed factors such as expansive versus restrictive eligibility requirements as well as the rates themselves. The authors
concluded that "ideology of parties does matter" (p. 208) but
that economic climate is a strong determinant of the comprehensiveness of welfare benefits. For instance, during times of
economic growth the Liberals adopted expansionary welfare
policies while the Conservatives were more restrictive. During
a downturn in the economy, however, the ideologies apparently informing the respective parties played much less of a role,
as the NDP initiated restrictive policies regarding welfare benefits and eligibility that were later endorsed by the Progressive
Conservative Party.
In summary, the studies outlined above suggest that political parties can influence the dynamics inherent to the policy
process, including welfare policy, albeit in a modest manner.
This study provides an important contribution to the literature, however, as it is far from conclusive to what extent, if any,
political parties influenced the poverty reduction effectiveness
of the social welfare programs delivered by Canadian provinces following the promulgation of the CHST. It is the dearth of
knowledge in this important area that amplifies the relevance
of this study.
Methods

CanadianPolitical Parties
There were four main political parties that dominated the
provincial political landscape during the period investigated
in this study. These parties were the Progressive Conservative
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Party, the Liberal Party, the NDP and the Parti Qubb6cois (PQ),
which is based exclusively in the province of Quebec.
The Progressive Conservative Party is the primary centerright political party in the bulk of the Canadian provinces.
This party promotes a relatively low level of state intervention
within a market economy and emphasizes the role of individuals, families, and volunteer organizations in providing social
welfare services (Archer & Whitehorn, 1990; Ball, Dagger,
Christian, & Campbell, 2009; Graham, Swift, & Delaney, 2009;
Kneebone & Mckenzie, 2001).
The Liberal Party is a centrist party that is prominent at
both the federal and provincial levels. It falls to the left of the
Progressive Conservative Party, as its leaders often emphasize
a type of welfare liberalism that proposes a conspicuous level of
government regulation, so as to promote equality of opportunity as well as a moderately generous social safety net (Archer
& Whitehorn, 1990; Ball et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2009).
The origins of the NDP, a left-of-center political party, lie
within social democracy, as it is renowned for stressing a collectivist and egalitarian policy stance. Its supporters are generally less resistant than Progressive Conservatives and Liberals
to high levels of taxation as long as a comprehensive safety
net characterized by universal programs is offered (Archer &
Whitehorn, 1990; Klassen & Buchannan, 2006; Kneebone &
Mckenzie, 2001).
The PQ is also a left-wing party. Like the NDP, it often receives support from trade unions and promotes policies that
strongly emphasize a redistributive role for the state and relatively generous social programs (Graham et al., 2009).
ProvincialSocial Welfare Programs
Three major social welfare programs administered by
the Canadian provinces are Social Assistance, Provincial Tax
Credits and Workers' Compensation (Habibov & Fan, 2008).
Social Assistance, often referred to as "welfare," is an income
source of last resort for those who lack labor market earnings
and are not eligible for social insurance schemes that target unemployed, disabled, and elderly persons. Program recipients,
all of whom must undergo a rigorous needs test, include single
men and women without dependents, but single mothers
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constitute the largest proportion of beneficiaries (Jbrgen,
Loftstrom, & Zhang, 2006).
Provincial Tax Credits are poverty reduction measures that
assist individuals and families in their overall cost of living
expenses. These benefits are considered tax expenditures as
they are delivered through the tax system. Consequently, they
are administratively inexpensive, with an application process
that is much less intrusive than Social Assistance. Moreover,
these measures are much less stigmatizing than welfare (Cost
of Social Security, n.d.; Habibov & Fan, 2007; Lightman, 2003).
The other provincial-based program considered in this
study, Workers' Compensation, is funded by employers and
provides funds to employees who face job loss due to a workrelated accident and/or disease. There are gaps in coverage,
however, as the self-employed are not covered under this
scheme, nor are workers who engage in activities at work
that fall outside their usual course of duties, such as the office
clerk who assists in moving heavy equipment (Armitage, 2003;
Habibov & Fan, 2007; Hick, 2007).

Data source
The source of data in this study was the Survey of Labour
and Income Dynamics (SLID), which has been a primary source
of data for Statistics Canada-the nation's leading statistical
authority since 1996 (Chen, 2008; Habibov & Fan, 2008). The
data collected by SLID are representative of the population in
each Canadian province, including age and gender groups, as
well as family sizes. SLID data are collected on an annual basis
with a response rate of 80-85% and cross-sectional weights are
adjusted by Statistics Canada for non-responses. In this study
we used SLID micro-data files dating from 1996, the first year
SLID was conducted, until 2005, which is the most recent year
that SLID micro-data are publicly available.

Analytical Strategy
There were two key steps we completed prior to our testing
to see if the political party in power appeared to influence the
poverty reduction effectiveness of the provinces' social welfare
programs. The first step was to estimate the poverty reduction effectiveness of specific social welfare programs in the
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individual provinces by computing the extent to which these
programs lowered each province's poverty rate and poverty
gap ratio. The second step was to determine the political party
in power in each province for every year from 1996 to 2005.
In terms of the first step, before computing the poverty
rate and gap we established a poverty line of 60 percent of the
family median equivalized disposable income. There were two
reasons for choosing this as the poverty line. First, it was used in
other studies that focused on measuring the poverty reduction
effectiveness of income security programs in Canada (Habibov
& Fan, 2007, 2008). Second, this same poverty line is used by
countries within the European Union (Eurostat, 2000).
As noted above, the poverty line we employed was based
on family income. As a means of adjusting for family size, we
utilized a square root equivalence scale that was computed
by dividing the total family income by the square root of the
number of people in a family (Habibov & Fan, 2008).
Subsequently, we repeatedly applied the poverty line to
all ten Canadian provinces for the years of 1996 to 2005, after
which we computed the poverty rate for all ten provinces
during the same time frame. These computations were based
on the adjusted, after-tax total disposable income following
the receipt of all cash transfers.
In addition to calculating the poverty rate, we calculated
the poverty gap ratio, which indicates how far, on average, the
poor fall below the poverty line. Not unlike our computation
of the poverty rate, we calculated the poverty gap ratio in all
ten Canadian provinces from 1996 to 2005. This calculation
was based on the adjusted, after-tax total disposable income
following the provinces' receipt of all cash transfer payments.
We then re-estimated the poverty rate and the poverty
gap with the assumption that the provinces were not delivering any provincial social welfare programs. Thus, we estimated the counterfactual by subtracting the monetary amount
of the provincial social welfare programs outlined above,
that is Social Assistance, Provincial Tax Credits, and Workers'
Compensation, from the adjusted total disposable income.
This procedure allowed us to determine what the provincial
poverty rates and gaps would be if these programs did not
exist. Consequently, we determined the poverty rates and
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poverty gap ratios before and after receipt of the benefits emanating from the provincial social welfare programs described
above. It should be noted that these rates and gap ratios were
obtained for all ten Canadian provinces for each year from
1996 to 2005.
Next, we estimated the poverty reduction effectiveness of
the provincial social welfare programs by employing the following formula (Habibov & Fan, 2007):
PRE =

(before

-

after)

X1 0 0

P'before

where PRE is poverty reduction effectiveness of provincial
social welfare programs; and PIbefore are the poverty indices
(poverty rate or poverty gap ratio) before receipt of provincial social welfare benefits; and PIaft are the poverty indices
(poverty rate or poverty gap ratio) after receipt of provincial
social welfare benefits. As a result of employing the above
formula, we determined the extent to which the provincial
social welfare programs of Social Assistance, Provincial Tax
Credits, and Workers Compensation reduced the poverty rate
and poverty gap for each Canadian province during the time
period from 1996 to 2005.
In order to execute the second step discussed above, we
conducted internet searches to find out which political party
was in power in each province for the years 1996 to 2005. In the
case of two different parties in power within the same year, the
party which was in power for the longest duration during that
year was identified. In the case of Quebec, the PQ was merged
with the NDP since both parties, as discussed above, embrace
a left-leaning policy platform.
The effectiveness of poverty rate reduction and the political
party in power in each province between 1996 and 2005 is reported in Table 1. The effectiveness of poverty gap ratio reduction and the political party in power in each province between
1996 and 2005 is reported in Table 2.
Following the completion of the procedures described
above, two one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests were
conducted to test for differences between the provinciallybased political parties in regards to the poverty reduction
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effectiveness of the social welfare programs they delivered
during the years they governed. One ANOVA was conducted
to test for differences in regards to reducing the poverty rate
and another ANOVA was conducted to test for differences in
regards to reducing the poverty gap ratio. Both were measured
in percentage points.
Table 1. Effectiveness of Poverty Rate Reduction and Political
Parties in Power by Province 1996-2005
Year (%)
Province

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Newfoundland
and Labrador
Prince Edward
Island

6.58

9.20

7.98

11.01

8.57

8.66

7.56

5.38

7.02

7.48

11.69

9.17

7.50

3.93

3.19

4.61

7.06

4.42

5.13

3.06

Nova Scotia

7.72

8.60

8.21

6.56

6.55

3.73

4.26

4.53

4.01

4.53

New
Brunswick

719

6.62

9.83

5.22

7.35

5.76

6.57

4.05

4.73

3.51

Quebec

6.64

11.27

11.50

11.89

8.94

8.88

11.21

9.49

9.39

9.07

Ontario

18.64

22.48

19.24

16.02

14.77

12.79

9.80

9.18

9.61

2.92

Manitoba

10.69

12.27

13.39

8.36

7.49

9.20

7.65

9.33

10.12

7.21

Saskatchewan

5.33

7.72

6.62

6.33

4.25

4.73

5.15

4.95

3.87

5.15

Alberta

11.55

10.68

11.08

11.66

15.14

15.22

15.57

14.59

14.84

16.63

British
Columbia

6.11

7.96

7.40

6.90

7.37

5.17

5.72

7.86

4.98

5.49

Note: Shaded areas denote years when Progressive Conservative governments were
in power in the province. Italicized figures denote years when Liberal governments
were in power in the province. The rest of the figures denote years when the NDP (or
the PQ in the case of Quebec) governed the province. Source: SLID 1996-2005.

Results
In terms of poverty rate reduction, the results of the
ANOVA yielded no differences between the political parties,
as F (2, 97) = 2.67, p = .07. There were also no significant differences detected in another ANOVA when poverty gap ratio reduction was the dependent variable, as F (2, 97) = 2.69, p = .07.
The complete results of both one-way ANOVA tests, including
descriptive statistics, are reported in Table 3.
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Table 2. Effectiveness of Poverty Gap Ratio Reduction and Political
Parties in Power by Province 1996-2005 (%)
Year (%)
Province

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Newfoundland
and Labrador
Prince Edward
Island

35.23

38.77

37.65

36.38

34.97

33.17

28.89

29.17

28.61

31.15

25.88

25.39

27.94

24.53

21.32

23.07

20.62

18.72

17.64

24.24

Nova Scotia

29.06

32.10

27.94

22.29

21.89

19.60

21.08

18.78

17.38

16.29

New
Brunswick

34.71

36.05

35,73

27.94

24.28

24.80

24.34

24.77

24.02

23.95

Quebec

40.01

41.06

41.55

37.19

35.30

33.28

32.69

30.43

30.24

27.82

Ontario

45.36

43.16

43.30

35.42

33.72

33.34

30.10

32.61

30.54

27.16

Manitoba

31.44

34.00

13.39

30.78

30.97

22.13

21.01

22.75

21.12

19.76

Saskatchewan

26.90

31.37

30.87

24.79

21.92

22.51

25.37

24.82

20.54

15.27

Alberta

25.49

23.78

21.00

23.16

26.70

24.98

22.37

18.10

17.19

21.96

British
Columbia

32.06

31.00

28.89

26.56

22.49

21.71

24.62

21.46

18.93

15.37

Note: Shaded areas denote years when Progressive Conservative governments were
in power in the province. Italicized figures denote years when Liberal governments
were in power in the province. The rest of figures denote years when the NDP (or the
PQ in the case of Quebec) governed the province. Source: SLID 1996-2005.

Table 3. ANOVA Results
Variable

Political party

N

M

SD

NDP/PQ

LIB

Poverty rate
reduction
effectiveness (%)

NDP/PQ
LIB
PRO CON

28
26
46

7.54

2.27

-

NS

7.73

2.02

9.39

5.07

NS

NS

Poverty gap ratio
reduction effectiveness (%)

NDP/PQ
LIB
PRO CON

28
26
46

28.01

6.97

-

NS

29.47

6.10

25.73

7.08

NS

NS

Note: NS = non-significant differences between group means.
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Discussion
The purpose of this study was to test if the governing
provincial political parties in Canada had any influence on
the poverty reduction effectiveness of three provincial social
welfare programs-Social Assistance, Provincial Tax Credits,
and Workers' Compensation-both in terms of reducing
poverty rates as well as poverty gap ratios. The results of our
analysis suggest that political parties, regardless of their distinct party platforms, did not have an influence during the investigated time period from 1996 to 2005. Consequently, there
are two important implications emanating from this study.
First, any potential differences between the governing political parties in regards to the poverty reduction effectiveness
of provincial social welfare programs may very well have been
overridden by economic restructuring heavily influenced by
the tenets of neo-liberalism. As discussed above, the shift from
CAP to the CHST was characterized by substantial funding
cutbacks. Due to this reduction in federal funding, it is not surprising that the poverty reduction effectiveness of the provinces' social welfare programs reported above decreased between
1996 and 2005, particularly in the area of poverty gap ratio reduction (Weaver, Habibov, & Fan, 2010).
The declining poverty reduction effectiveness of the provincial programs was not completely uniform, but it was a noticeable trend. Consequently, the findings in our analysis, in combination with this overall trend of declining poverty reduction
effectiveness of provincial social welfare programs, suggest
that the influence of a market-driven, neo-liberal approach was
adopted by all of Canada's governing provincial parties. While
previous authors have noted the shift of the NDP toward the
political right in several provinces following the promulgation
of the CHST (Erickson & Laycock, 2002; Klassen & Buchannan,
2006; Mullaly, 2007) this study is unique in that all of Canada's
leading provincial parties were compared in their influence on
the poverty reduction effectiveness of provincial social welfare
programs over a 10-year period.
Another possible reason for the lack of influence of political parties on provincial social welfare programs was the
new paradigm that emerged in Canada in the mid-1990s and
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markedly influenced the nation's policy landscape. This new
paradigm emphasized human capital investments over income
transfer payments as a means of reducing poverty. According
to this new paradigm, which drew support by key thinkers
such as Anthony Giddens and Third Way political leaders like
Bill Clinton in the United States and Tony Blair in the United
Kingdom, education is a more effective tool for poverty reduction than income transfer payments. It is believed that highly
trained and educated workers are more likely to secure stable
employment and enjoy steadily increasing incomes than are
their lesser trained counterparts (Banting, 2006; Mullaly, 2007;
Pawlick & Stroick, 2004).
This new paradigm was endorsed by provincial political
leaders across Canada, regardless of where their respective
parties were apparently located on the political spectrum. The
professed reasons for their endorsement did vary, ranging
from the need to end welfare dependency to the promotion
of social inclusion for all members of society (Jenson, 2004).
Boychuk (2004) reports the introduction of the Canada Child
Tax Benefit (CCTB) in 1996 was indicative of this new paradigm discussed above. Administered through the tax system,
the CCTB targets working families with children and explicitly aims to increase incentives for labor market participation.
Families on Social Assistance who also receive CCTB benefits
are subjected to clawbacks in their welfare payments. The
money saved as a result of these clawbacks is reinvested by
the provinces into services, which constitutes a form of human
capital investment.
It should also be noted that our study focused on a specific
outcome associated with the governing political parties, that
is, the poverty reduction effectiveness of their provincial social
welfare programs, whereas the bulk of the previous studies
discussed above tested for an association between political
parties and social welfare expenditures. It is particularly noteworthy there were no differences between the governing political parties in their influence on the selected programs' capacity to reduce both the poverty level and the poverty gap ratio.
The fact that there were no differences in these two indicators
provides more evidence for the lack of influence generated by
governing political parties in the tested area than if only one
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indicator was employed.
Second, the time frame considered in this study (1996-2005)
allows for another important contribution to the literature. As
outlined above, a strong majority of studies regarding party
influence on welfare expenditures and outcomes considered
the time frame of the 1950s to 1990s. In virtually all of the industrialized nations, the 1950s to 1970s era is considered the
so-called "golden age" of the welfare state, as Keynesianism
was the dominant approach to developing and implementing
social policy (Broad &Antony, 1999; Brodie, 1999; Browne, 1999;
Guest, 1997). As noted above, however, the post-World War II
Keynesian consensus slowly but surely unraveled, and by the
mid-1990s and into the 21st century, the New Economy, characterized by substantial levels of financial and labor market
deregulation, was in full force in Canada and throughout the
industrialized world (Broad &Antony, 2006). Hence, this study
provides valuable insights into the association between political parties and poverty reduction effectiveness in a social and
economic policy era, which is a substantially different focus
from previous studies.
Despite our finding that variation in governing political
parties did not account for differences in the poverty reduction
effectiveness of the selected social welfare programs, there were,
as noted above in our reference to our previous study, noticeable differences in how the poverty reduction effectiveness of
social welfare programs changed amongst the provinces from
1996 to 2005. For instance, in terms of poverty rate reduction,
five provinces exhibited a noticeable decline in their effectiveness over this time frame, while three experienced increases in
this area. The province which experienced the largest increase
in its effectiveness to reduce its poverty rate was Alberta,
which was governed by the Progressive Conservatives from
1996 to 2005. As for effectiveness in reducing the poverty gap
ratio, all of the provinces exhibited a decrease over the time
frame noted above, though the provinces did vary in terms
of their rates and magnitude of decrease (Weaver, Habibov, &
Fan, 2010).
The fact that variation in governing political parties did
not account for differences in the dependent variable considered in this study prompts the question: If not political parties,
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then what does explain differences between the provinces in
regards to the poverty reduction effectiveness of their social
welfare programs? Given that a variety of factors influence
the development and implementation of social policy (Tang,
1996), it is highly unlikely this variation can be attributed to
one determinant. That being said, there may be several factors
that shed light on this issue.
One factor may be differences between the financial capabilities of the provinces to finance social welfare programs
due to inequality in their wealth and budget revenues. In their
analysis of differences between the states in terms of welfare
benefits, Whitaker and Time (2001) determined that states with
relatively high per capita incomes had relatively higher welfare
benefit rates than states with relatively low per capita incomes.
While it would be erroneous to generalize the findings of this
American-based study to the Canadian provinces, the findings
do warrant consideration, particularly when one considers the
structural similarities between the two nations' social welfare
systems (Weaver, Habibov, & Fan, 2010).
Another factor could be the administrative professionalism of the government employees of the various provinces.
Evidence for this was gathered by Rodgers, Beamer, & Payne
(2008), who conducted regression analyses to ascertain factors
that explained variance in what they refer to as states' "welfare
and income support regimes" (p. 236). This was a composite
measure of a state's poverty reduction efforts that included the
generosity of welfare benefits as well as the extent to which
benefits are made available to those in need. Rodgers et al.
(2008) found that the administrative professionalism of specific states, which included the mean compensation per capita
of state employees, partially explained the variance between
the states' respective welfare and income support regimes.
Furthermore, the current era of devolution within social
welfare programming is characterized by greater discretion
of program personnel, including agency and case managers, in how welfare programs are carried out (Fording, Soss,
& Schram, 2007). Consequently, this greater discretion could
potentially contribute to variations between the provinces
regarding the poverty reduction effectiveness of their social
welfare programs.
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Finally, in a European-based study, H61sch and Kraus (2006)
determined that variation in forms of targeting (e.g., the extent
to which the social safety net applies for the entire population
of a region equally as well as the duration for which benefits
are granted) influences how much social assistance programs
reduce inequality. Even though this study focused on inequality reduction, the findings gleaned by the authors suggest that
targeting could also be considered when seeking to explain
why provincial social welfare programs in Canada were found
to vary in their poverty reduction effectiveness.
Clearly, there is a need for further research to determine
if these suggested factors account for variation between the
provinces in the extent to which their social safety nets reduce
poverty rates and gap ratios. We propose that the fulfillment of
this need will help fill the above-described theoretical void regarding determinants of subnational variation in social policy,
including poverty reduction policy (Imbeau et al., 2000).
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